As is well known to those skilled in the art, as telematics is developed and applied to a vehicle, the vehicle communicates with users outside the vehicle through an external wired/wireless communication network. The users outside the vehicle may monitor a state of the vehicle and control the vehicle from the outside before getting in the vehicle through the telematics.
As described above, telematics provides much convenience in using the vehicle, but has a risk that an external incorrect user (hacker) may illegally access the vehicle. Accordingly, considerable security is demanded in the vehicle to which the telematics is applied.
In the related art, a scope of the vehicle security focuses on security of the vehicle itself, such as a door key, an indoor movement detection device, and immobilization. In the telematics field, security of a telematics server (or center), security authentication of a mobile terminal (for example, a smart phone) and the like have been developed and applied to the vehicle.
However, data channels, which general users commonly access when the general users pay their communication charges for a general wireless network, are currently opened, and a security level of a Wi-Fi zone and the like of the vehicle is still a level of a general Wi-Fi zone, so that the security still has vulnerability. That is, a range of vehicle control for a telematics service is at a light level (less than about 2% of the entire vehicle control) when considering messages transceived for several control periods in the vehicle itself.
However, the TMU is connected with several networks of the vehicle, for example, an engine controller, a body controller, a chassis controller, and a CAN, for controlling the vehicle and collecting vehicle information. Accordingly, it is concerned that vehicle network security can be hacked by an external third element.
As an intrusion path from the outside, as illustrated in FIG. 1, there is a high possibility of a direct intrusion from an element, other than a mobile terminal (smart phone) and the telematics center among constituent elements of the telematics, to the vehicle. Examples of the direct intrusion may include an intrusion using a wireless network between the telematics center and the vehicle and an intrusion through Wi-Fi of the vehicle.
The above information disclosed in this Background section is only for enhancement of understanding of the background of the disclosure, and therefore, it may contain information that does not form the prior art that is already known in this country to a person of ordinary skill in the art.